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CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES, RULINGS, AND RELATED CASES

Pursuant to Circuit Rule 28(a)(1), amici curiae certify as follows.
(A)

Parties and Amici. All parties and amici appearing in this Court are listed in
the Briefs for Appellants and Appellees.

(B)

Rulings Under Review. References to the rulings at issue appear in the
Certificate filed April 6, 2017.

(C)

Related Cases. To the knowledge of counsel, other than any cases listed in
the Certificate filed April 6, 2017, the case on review was not previously
before this Court or any other court, and there are no other related cases
currently pending in this Court or in any other court.

/s/
Counsel for Amici Curiae
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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS
ASTM

American Society for Testing and Materials

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
All applicable statutes, etc., are contained in the Brief for Appellants and
Appellees.

STATEMENT OF IDENTITY, INTEREST IN CASE, AND SOURCE OF
AUTHORITY TO FILE
(A)

Statement of Identity. Amici, listed below, are law professors who teach and
have written extensively about trademark law.1
Stacey Dogan, Boston University School of Law
Jessica Litman, University of Michigan Law School
Mark P. McKenna, Notre Dame Law School
Betsy Rosenblatt, Whittier Law School
Elizabeth I. Winston, Catholic University, Columbus School of Law
Rebecca Tushnet, Harvard Law School

(B)

Interest in Case. Our sole interest in this case is in the development of
trademark law in a way that serves the public interest. We do not, in general,
agree with the district court’s copyright ruling, but we are especially

1

Amici sign this brief in their individual capacities. Institutions are listed for
identification purposes only.
1
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concerned with that court’s misapplication of key trademark doctrines.
Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003), and Rogers
v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989), both mandate that trademark claims
cannot be based upon the idea that the content of the defendant’s expressive
goods or services implies authorization from the creator of that content. The
district court’s trademark reasoning ignores the statutory and First
Amendment concerns that should exclude Public Resource’s conduct from the
scope of trademark law and place it within copyright law, no matter what the
proper resolution of the copyright claims is.
(C)

Authority to File. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(a), all
parties received appropriate notice of and consented to the filing of this brief.
A separate brief is warranted pursuant to Circuit Rule 29(d). The District
Court’s ruling has implications far beyond this particular case, as it threatens
to undermine critical limitations on the scope of trademark law and to put
trademark law into conflict with copyright law and the First Amendment.

STATEMENT OF AUTHORSHIP AND FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS
No party’s counsel authored this Amici Curiae brief in whole or in part. No
party or party’s counsel contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or
submitting this brief; and No person, other than the Amici Curiae or their counsel
contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief. All
2
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signatories speak only on behalf of themselves. Institutional affiliations are listed
for identification purposes only.

3
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
ASTM’s fundamental complaint is about unauthorized use of its intangible
content—the standards for which it claims copyright ownership. Dastar
unambiguously holds, however, that only confusion regarding the source of physical
goods is actionable under the Lanham Act; confusion regarding the authorship of the
standards or their authorization is not actionable. ASTM cannot avoid Dastar just
because Public Resource creates digital copies of those standards. Consumers
encounter the ASTM marks only as part of the standards, into which ATSM chose
to embed the marks. As a result, any “confusion” could only be the result of the
content itself. Dastar teaches that control over the creative work is the province of
copyright law, not the Lanham Act. Accepting ASTM’s argument would create
exactly the kind of “mutant copyright” rejected by the Supreme Court.
Along with Dastar, trademark law contains additional limiting doctrines to avoid
this problem when it comes from allegedly implied endorsement based upon the
content of a work. Under Rogers v. Grimaldi, where the allegedly infringing use
comes from the content of a work—including its title—infringement liability is
limited to cases of affirmative misrepresentations about authorization (or uses
unrelated to the content, not argued here), and does not extend to any implication of
authorization that might come from the mere presence of a mark as part of a work.
Rogers ensures that Dastar’s mandate cannot be evaded by making arguments about
4
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the “quality” of the defendant’s copies, as ASTM did here. Together, Dastar and
Rogers set out a clear rule that defines the boundaries of copyright and trademark
law.
ARGUMENT
I.

ASTM’s Claims are Barred Under Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox
Dastar copied footage from the Crusade in Europe television series originally

released by Twentieth Century Fox’s predecessor in interest and re-used that footage
in its own video series without attribution to Fox. According to Fox, this constituted
reverse passing off. Dastar, Fox claimed, was passing off Fox’s content as though it
were Dastar’s own, thereby falsely designating the origin of the video series in
violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 27. That section of the
statute makes actionable
use of any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof,
or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or
false or misleading representation of fact, which . . . is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection,
or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin,
sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial
activities by another person.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2012) (emphasis added).
According to the Supreme Court, as used in the statute, “origin of goods”
refers only to “the producer of the tangible goods that are offered for sale, and not
to the author of any idea, concept, or communication embodied in those goods.”

5
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Dastar, 539 U.S. at 37. Indeed, “origin of goods” is “incapable of connoting the
person or entity that originated the ideas or communications that ‘goods’ embody or
contain.” Id. at 32.
Under Dastar, only misrepresentations of the origin of physical goods are
actionable under § 43(a). Other sorts of misrepresentations, including but not limited
to misrepresentations of the origin of creative content, are not actionable. Phx.
Entm’t Partners v. Rumsey, 829 F.3d 817, 828 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Even as to
[communicative goods like documentary videotapes and karaoke tracks], the Court
made clear that the “good” whose “origin” is material for purposes of a trademark
infringement claim is the “tangible product sold in the marketplace” rather than the
creative content of that product.”). Dastar thus precludes claims that use of the
plaintiff’s mark suggests that the plaintiff created or authorized a particular physical
(or digital) copy, if the evidence of misrepresentation is based solely on the content
of the copy. See Slep-Tone Entertainment Corp. v. Wired for Sound Karaoke & DJ
Servs., LLC, No. 14-17229 (9th Cir. Jan. 18, 2017) (per curiam) (alleged confusion
caused by the content of copyrighted music files was not actionable under Dastar);
Phx. Entm’t, 829 F.3d 817, 828 (same).2

2

Because the Dastar rule derives from a construction of the text of the Lanham
Act, it does not depend on the copyright status of the plaintiff’s work—it applies
with respect to works currently within copyright as well as uncopyrightable works.
See Bretford Manufacturing, Inc. v. Smith System Manufacturing Corp., 419 F.3d
6
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ASTM cannot avoid that result just because it chose to embed its marks in its
content. Indeed, the Supreme Court anticipated—and rejected—precisely the
argument ASTM urged here. The Court noted that if “Dastar had simply copied the
television series as Crusade in Europe and sold it as Crusade in Europe, without
changing the title or packaging (including the original credits to Fox),” Fox still
would not have been satisfied and likely would have brought a passing off claim.
Dastar, 539 U.S. at 36. That claim, of course, would have been the same one ASTM
made here: it would have alleged confusion based on the credits identifying the
original creators, just as ASTM alleges confusion based on the inclusion of the
ASTM marks within the content. Far from endorsing such a claim, the Court invoked
this hypothetical claim to demonstrate why “origin” must be understood to refer only
to the origin of tangible goods. Id. As the full context of the Court’s discussion
makes clear, its interpretation of “origin” ruled out not only claims for failing to
credit the creator of a work, but also claims based simply on crediting the creator,
“if that [crediting] should be regarded as implying the creator’s ‘sponsorship or
approval’ of the copy.” Id. (emphasis added).
If it were otherwise, Disney could prevent others from selling copies of
Steamboat Willie even after its copyright expired by arguing that, because Mickey

576 (7th Cir. 2005); Williams v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1177,
1185 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
7
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Mouse is in the movie and is Disney’s trademark, consumers will be confused about
the source of physical copies of the movie. Under ASTM’s interpretation, that claim
would technically survive Dastar because it is nominally focused on the source of
physical goods, even though in truth it hinges on an assertion that consumers will
think Disney authorized the reproduction of the content. Dastar would be a dead
letter, since it would allow any plaintiff to plead around the holding, creating
precisely the sort of “mutant copyright law” the Supreme Court rejected. Id. at 34;
cf. Bretford, 419 F.3d 580–81 (noting that consumers might see marks embedded in
other products, and holding that Dastar bars claims based solely on that embedding).
Post-Dastar decisions have routinely held that, if the plaintiff’s only claim of
confusion comes from the reproduction of the expressive content of a work that
includes trademarks, then Dastar ought to apply, because origin cannot be inferred
from the content alone. In Phoenix, for example, the Seventh Circuit rejected the
plaintiff’s claim that consumers were likely to be confused about the origin of
unauthorized karaoke tracks in which the plaintiff’s mark was embedded. Phoenix
Entm’t, 829 F.3d at 829 (“That the Sound Choice mark is embedded in the creative
content of the karaoke track and is visible to the public whenever the track is played
does not falsely suggest that Slep–Tone is endorsing the performance …”); see also
Mark P. McKenna & Lucas S. Osborn, Trademarks and Digital Goods, 92 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1425, 1451 (2017) (“Tangibility dictates that the proper inquiry must

8
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be whether consumers are likely to be confused about the source of some tangible
good sold by the defendant, not the good depicted within the creative content. …
And any confusion about the source of the digital file would have to be traceable to
something other than the content of that file …”).
It is, of course, likely that consumers listening to copies of music files will
correctly attribute the plaintiff’s creative content to the plaintiff, but as the Seventh
Circuit explained, that is true regardless of whether the copies are authorized or not;
“all that distinguishes the legitimate copy from the illegitimate copy is authorization
to make the copy—and that sounds much more like a claim of copyright
infringement than a claim of trademark infringement.” Phoenix Entm’t, 829 F.3d at
at 825. Because there is no reason to believe that consumers know or care about the
details of the physical substrate, other confusion theories are precluded under
Dastar. Id. at 829 (“And because patrons see only the creative content of the tracks
rather than the particular medium from which the tracks are played, there is no reason
to think that they believe that the digital file, wherever it resides, was itself produced
or approved by Slep–Tone.”).3 See also Pulse Entertainment Corp. v. David, No.
CV 14-4732 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2014) (Dastar barred false designation of origin
claim based on misattribution of hologram to wrong creator; hologram was creative

3

Proper labeling of the source, at most, is all that is required to avoid confusion.
Public Resource’s website is clearly labeled as such, rather than as an ASTM
website.
9
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work like a cartoon); Masck v. Sports Illustrated, 5 F. Supp. 3d. 881 (E.D. Mich.
2014) (Dastar barred false designation of origin claim based on copying of photos);
Smith v. BarnesandNoble.com, LLC, No. 1:12-cv-04374, 2014 BL 263099
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2014) (Dastar barred claims of false representation of affiliation
between an author and a distributor based merely on sale of copies of author’s book,
even if the distributor was distributing unauthorized copies); Antidote Int’l Films,
Inc. v. Bloomsbury Publ’g, PLC, 467 F. Supp. 2d 394, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (Dastar
barred false affiliation claim where “one person is the publisher of a novel and the
other is the author of the novel, because the holding of Dastar would be meaningless
if a false authorship claim could’ be recast in this manner”); see also Cyber
Websmith, Inc. v. American Dental Association, 2010 WL 3075726, No. 09-CV6198 (N.D. Ill., Aug. 4, 2010) (holding that “the inherent misrepresentation that
accompanies the unauthorized copying and distribution of another’s copyrighted
work” is not enough to create a Lanham Act cause of action separate from
copyright).
Phoenix is also instructive because it rejected the “inferior copies” theory
ASTM advanced before the district court. As the Seventh Circuit explained, the
problem with that theory is that, even if true, the inferior quality of copies is
irrelevant if the defendant is not providing consumers tangible goods in the
marketplace. Phx. Emtm’t, 829 F.3d at 831 (“Whatever wrong the defendants may

10
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have committed by making (or causing to be made) unauthorized copies of Slep–
Tone's tracks, they are not alleged to have held out a tangible good sold in the
marketplace as a Slep–Tone product. Consequently, the defendants' alleged conduct
is not actionable as trademark infringement.”) (emphasis added). The Phoenix
court’s reasoning applies here, where, in technical terms, the physical copy any
individual consumer perceives is made on her own computer. The fact that it is sent
from a Public Resource computer does not change the basic problem that ASTM’s
real objection is to copying of its content, not to any implied misrepresentation about
the origin or endorsement of the physical arrangement of ones and zeros or electronic
impulses.
II.

ASTM’s Claims are also Barred Under Rogers v. Grimaldi
As the Eleventh Circuit has explained, Rogers is “the landmark case for

balancing trademark and First Amendment rights.” University of Alabama Bd. of
Trustees v. New Life Art, Inc., 683 F.3d 1266, 1277 (11th Cir. 2012). In Rogers, the
defendant created a film about two fictional Italian dancers who were called “Ginger
and Fred,” which was the film’s title. Ginger Rogers, a famous dancer who often
worked with Fred Astaire, sued under § 43(a), arguing that the film’s title falsely
implied that she was endorsing or featured in the film, Rogers, 875 F.2d at 997, just
as ASTM argues that the presence of its trademarks as part of its standards implies
that it endorses the copies on PR’s website.

11
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The Second Circuit made clear that, while purchasers have a right to avoid
deception, where the “product” at issue is itself expressive, the Lanham Act should
be read narrowly to avoid impinging on speech protected by the First Amendment:
We believe that in general the Act should be construed to apply to artistic
works only where the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion
outweighs the public interest in free expression. In the context of allegedly
misleading titles using a celebrity’s name, that balance will normally not
support application of the Act unless the title has no artistic relevance to the
underlying work whatsoever, or if it has some artistic relevance, unless the
title explicitly misleads as to the source of the work.
Id. at 999. “The canon of constitutional avoidance in this area is thus not a device of
judicial evasion but an effort to reconcile the commercial values protected by the
Lanham Act and the democratic value of expressive freedom.” N.A.A.C.P. v.
Radiance Foundation, Inc., 786 F.3d 316, 322 (4th Cir. 2015).
Rogers addresses the First Amendment concerns that would arise were
trademark law to allow infringement claims based on implications of affiliation or
sponsorship due only to use of a trademark as part of the content of expressive works
that are the goods being sold (or are the services being rendered). The rule of
Rogers, which has been followed by numerous courts,4 protects consumers against

4

See, e.g., Univ. of Alabama Bd. of Trustees, 683 F.3d at 1278; E.S.S. Entm’t 2000,
Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 2008); ETW Corp. v.
Jireh Pub., Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 928 n. 11 (6th Cir. 2003); Cliffs Notes, Inc. v.
Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g Group, 886 F.2d 490, 495 (2d Cir. 1989) (the
Rogers test is “generally applicable to Lanham Act claims against works of artistic
expression”).
12
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material deception without creating a chilling effect for producers of expressive
works.5 Rogers usually applies where the trademark owner is the subject of the
content, but its speech-protective rationale is at least as applicable where the
trademark owner initially created the content, and thus the basic identification of the
trademark owner is truthful (albeit allegedly misleading by implication). In such
situations, Rogers works consistently with Dastar.6 See Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt,
The Adventure of the Shrinking Public Domain, 86 U. COLO. L. REV. 561, 606
(2015). Rogers is thus another route to prevent the creation of a “mutant copyright
law,” by preventing a copyright owner from asserting trademark rights to prevent
copying independent of copyright law.

5

Although many works protected by Rogers are traditional artistic works, the same
principles apply to political and other non-advertising speech, which equally
receives full First Amendment protection. See, e.g., U.S. Olympic Committee v.
American Media, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1209 (D. Colo. 2001) (applying
Rogers to nonfiction magazine); cf. Mattel Inc. v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894, 906
(9th Cir. 2002) (“If speech is not purely commercial—that is, if it does more than
propose a commercial transaction—then it is entitled to full First Amendment
protection.”) (in the context of applying Rogers).
6
Indeed, the use here would satisfy the more stringent standard rejected by Rogers,
that of necessity, because the standards cannot be identified without reference to
ASTM. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 998. The same rationale could be offered under the
heading of “nominative fair use.” See New Kids On The Block v. News America
Pub., Inc., 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992) (explaining nominative fair use), aff’g 745
F. Supp. 1540, 1545 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (using Rogers to protect news publications);
see also William McGeveran, The Trademark Fair Use Reform Act, 90 B.U. L.
REV. 2267 (2010) (explaining substantial overlap between doctrines). Amici
suggest that Rogers is a simpler test in the instant case because it offers a rule for
non-advertising expression generally, while nominative fair use can apply to
advertising uses as well.
13
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Indeed, Rogers confirms that the correct way to read Dastar is to prevent
parties from evading the holding by referring to irrelevant tangible goods. Courts in
Rogers cases have for decades been barring claims because the allegedly infringing
use was part of the defendant’s content, implicitly refusing to let parties
disingenuously claim that confusion related to the tangible copies provided by the
defendant rather than the intangible content. When a defendant uses another’s
trademark as part of a work, whether in the title or the content, claims based on
allegedly implied endorsement are barred absent an explicit misrepresentation of
sponsorship, endorsement, or origin. Thus, the distinction that ASTM used to avoid
Dastar—a claim that the alleged confusion is based not on the origin of the content
of the standards, but on the implied endorsement of the specific copies of the
standards on PR’s website—is invalid.7
“It is well established that the use of a mark alone is not enough to satisfy [the
explicit misleadingness] prong of the Rogers test.” Brown v. Elec. Arts, 724 F.3d
1235, 1245 (9th Cir. 2013). If use of a mark alone were sufficient, “it would render
Rogers a nullity.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Elec. Arts, 724

7

Likewise, when Steamboat Willie enters the public domain, as it will shortly do,
Disney should not be able to prevent others from making copies available by
alleging, as ASTM did, that the copies at issue are bad ones and that the presence
of its trademark (Mickey Mouse) in the copies and descriptions thereof implies
Disney’s endorsement. There is no difference between Disney’s hypothetical endrun around copyright law and ASTM’s here.
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F.3d at 1246, 1248 (“To be relevant [under Rogers], evidence must relate to the
nature of the behavior of the identifying material’s user, not the impact of the use.
Even if Brown could offer a survey demonstrating that consumers of the Madden
NFL series believed that Brown endorsed the game, that would not support the claim
that the use was explicitly misleading to consumers…. Brown would need to
demonstrate that EA explicitly misled consumers as to his involvement.”). Public
Resource made no explicit claims of authorization, affiliation, or sponsorship. Cf.
Radiance Found, 786 F.3d at 324 (explaining that Lanham Act’s “in connection
with” requirement demands a nexus between the use and a commercial transaction,
not just the presence of a mark); Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. New Line Cinema, 200
F.3d 593, 595 (9th Cir. 2000) (rejecting Comedy III”s argument that “the [video]
clip at issue falls under the protection of the Lanham Act because it contains
elements that in other contexts might serve as trademarks”); Ho v. Taflove, 696 F.
Supp. 2d 950, 956 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (holding that communicative use for expressive
purposes is not the kind of use trademark law targets), aff’d, 648 F.3d 489 (7th Cir.
2011).
III.

Conclusion
The appropriate scope of ASTM’s rights in copies of its standards is

determined by copyright law, not trademark law. It is there, if at all, that any remedy
lies for Public Resource’s copying.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court should be
reversed.
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